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Abstract
Background: Beyond providing cues about an agent’s intention, communicative actions convey information about the
presence of a second agent towards whom the action is directed (second-agent information). In two psychophysical studies
we investigated whether the perceptual system makes use of this information to infer the presence of a second agent when
dealing with impoverished and/or noisy sensory input.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Participants observed point-light displays of two agents (A and B) performing separate
actions. In the Communicative condition, agent B’s action was performed in response to a communicative gesture by agent
A. In the Individual condition, agent A’s communicative action was replaced with a non-communicative action. Participants
performed a simultaneous masking yes-no task, in which they were asked to detect the presence of agent B. In Experiment
1, we investigated whether criterion c was lowered in the Communicative condition compared to the Individual condition,
thus reflecting a variation in perceptual expectations. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the congruence between A’s
communicative gesture and B’s response, to ascertain whether the lowering of c in the Communicative condition reflected a
truly perceptual effect. Results demonstrate that information extracted from communicative gestures influences the
concurrent processing of biological motion by prompting perception of a second agent (second-agent effect).
Conclusions/Significance: We propose that this finding is best explained within a Bayesian framework, which gives a
powerful rationale for the pervasive role of prior expectations in visual perception.
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Introduction
Communicative gestures always presuppose the presence of a
second agent [1,2,3]. Consider for example the gesture of pointing:
This referential gesture works by directing the attention of another
agent to some location in the surrounding environment. Even if no
other person is visible in the scene, an observer watching an agent
performing such a gesture would assume that there is a second
person towards whom the gesture is directed [4]. This grants
communicative gestures a special informational status: Beyond
providing information about the actor, they also convey
information about the presence of an interaction partner towards
whom the action is directed (second-agent information).
The present study aimed at investigating to what extent, in the
presence of impoverished and/or noisy visual information, the
perceptual system makes use of this information to infer the
presence of a second agent. Using a simultaneous masking
detection task, Manera, Becchio, Schouten, Bara, and Verfaillie
[5] demonstrated that observing a communicative gesture
facilitates visual discrimination of a second agent. Participants
observed point-light displays of two agents (A and B) performing
separate actions. In the communicative condition, the action of
agent B was performed in response to a communicative gesture
performed by agent A. In the individual condition, agent A’s
communicative action was replaced with a non-communicative
action. Results (in a two-alternative forced choice task) showed
that observing the communicative gesture performed by agent A
enhanced visual detection of agent B, embedded in a noise mask of
moving point lights. These findings suggest that second-agent
information facilitates perception of another agent by allowing
observers to predict the other person’s action. Put differently, in
the context of a communicative interaction, the action of one
agent can serve as a predictor of the other agent’s action. But what
happens when no other agent is in fact present? Are observers
prompted to infer the presence of a second agent even when no
agent is actually there?
In Bayesian terms, the function of the perceptual system is to
build a plausible model of the world by optimally integrating
currently available sensory evidence with expectations about the
state of the external environment (priors, [6,7]). There is convincing
evidence that low-level perceptual activity can be modulated by
higher-level cognitive factors [8] and that expectations – either
induced by instructions or based on the statistical distribution of
previous sensory inputs - can strongly affect the contents of visual
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been shown to vary according to the type of observed action. For
simple goal directed actions such as lifting an arm or pressing a
button, perceptual judgment primarily relies on the external visual
input. For actions directed at more complex goals (e.g., actions
requiring the execution of a combination of basic actions) prior
expectations exert a stronger influence, to the detriment of the
available sensory information. A similar over-reliance on priors is
reported when observed actions fit into a context of social
interaction: Prior expectations are favored over visual information
[11]. In this framework, observing a communicative action should
influence perception by increasing the prior probability that a
second-agent is present in the scene. This updating of prior
expectations can be expected to bias observer’s performance
especially when stimulus-driven processing is made more difficult
(e.g., by simultaneous masking). Indeed, the less reliable the input,
the more perception is influenced by the prior. As a result,
observers might be induced to perceive a second agent,
irrespectively of whether a second agent is in fact present or not.
Signal detection theory (SDT) provides a suitable tool to
investigate this process [12,13]. In SDT, participants’ correct
responses and errors in a detection task are used to estimate two
parameters, the sensitivity (d9) and the response criterion (c). Sensitivity
is a measure of the individual’s ability to discriminate between
signal and noise (e.g., between presence and absence of a second
agent in an animated clip); higher values of d9 (ranging from 0 to
+‘) indicate better discrimination ability. The response criterion is
a complex parameter, reflecting both the expected likelihood of
the signal being present in the stimulus and the decision process
involved in the response. Lower values of c (ranging from 2‘ to
+‘) may indicate (a) a higher expected probability that the signal
will be present, and/or (b) a more liberal decision threshold,
requiring a lower degree of certainty before a positive response is
given. If observing a communicative gesture increases the
probability of perceiving a second agent - whether or not a
second agent is in fact present - then a lower response criterion
should be observed in visual detection of a human agent.
Specifically, let P(S) be the expected (prior) probability of signal
(i.e., a second agent is present), and P(N) be the expected (prior)
probability of noise (i.e., there is no second agent); the optimal
response criterion c
* is
c ~
ln½P(N) {ln½P(S) 
d’
:
Thus, when the prior probability of a second agent being
present increases, the optimal response criterion will decrease
accordingly. Here, we tested this hypothesis in two psychophysical
experiments.
Overview of Experiments and Results
Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, participants viewed point-
light stimuli of two human figures belonging to two experimental
conditions. Stimuli in the Communicative condition displayed a
communicative interaction between two agents, with agent A
performing a communicative gesture towards a second agent (B),
who responded accordingly (e.g., A asks B to squat down, B squats
down). Stimuli in the Individual condition were assembled by
replacing agent A’s communicative action with a non-
communicative action (e.g., A turns, B squats down).
Participants performed a simultaneous masking yes-no task, in
which they were asked to discriminate between signal trials
(containing agent B), and noise trials (not containing agent B).
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the criterion was lower
in the Communicative condition than in the Individual condition.
This suggests that observing a communicative gesture increased
the probability of perceiving a second agent, regardless of whether
a second agent was in fact present or not. However, an alternative
explanation might be that observers were simply more inclined to
report a signal in the Communicative condition compared to the
Individual condition. If this were the case, the lowered criterion in
the Communicative condition might reflect mere response bias. A
second experiment was designed to resolve this issue, by
manipulating the congruency of the two agents’ actions in the
Communicative condition.
Experiment 2. The aim of Experiment 2 was to ascertain
whether the lowered criterion in the Communicative condition in
Experiment 1 reflected a perceptual effect (i.e., an increased
likelihood of perceiving a second agent) rather than mere response
bias (i.e., an increased tendency to respond ‘‘yes’’). To this end, we
extended Experiment 1 by adding a third experimental condition,
i.e. a Communicative-incongruent condition, in which agent B’s response
(e.g., B squats down) did not match A’s communicative gesture
(e.g., A asks B to come closer). If the lowered criterion reflected
mere response bias, no difference in c should be observed between
the Communicative-congruent condition and the Communicative-
incongruent condition. In contrast, if observers were truly more
likely to perceive a second agent, we would expect a significant
decrease in c in the Communicative-congruent condition
compared to the Communicative-incongruent condition. This is
because in the congruent condition, but not in the incongruent
condition, the actions of agent A can be used to anticipate the
actions of agent B. We expected this to occur in both signal and
noise trials, as the noise trials contain elements of the
corresponding actions of agent B (see Experiment 1: Method).
Experiment 2 replicated the finding of Experiment 1, suggesting
that observers were more likely to see a second agent when
presented with Communicative-congruent actions compared with
individual actions. Also, the criterion was significantly lower in the
Communicative-congruent condition compared to the Commu-
nicative-incongruent condition; this rules out the possibility that
the second-agent effect only reflects changes in response bias.
Indeed, if our results were fully accounted for by response bias, the
same lowering of response criterion should have been observed in
both communicative conditions. The data from a post-experiment
questionnaire further supported a perceptual interpretation, by
showing that, when incorrectly reporting the presence of agent B,
participants reported perceiving a human figure (or part of it).
Methods
Experiment 1
Participants. Twenty-three undergraduate and graduate
students from the University of Turin (8 male and 15 female,
mean age=26.5 years, age range 21–34) volunteered to take part
in the experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
had provided informed written consent and were naı ¨ve with
respect to the purpose of the study. The study was approved by the
Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Psychology of the University
of Turin and was conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of two point-light figures with 13
markers indicating the centre of the major joints of a person (head,
shoulders, elbows, wrists, hips, knees, and feet). 10 point-light
stimuli were employed, 5 belonging to the Communicative
condition and 5 belonging to the Individual condition. Stimuli in
the Communicative condition displayed a communicative
Communication and Biological Motion Perception
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e22650interaction between two agents, with agent A performing a
communicative gesture towards a second agent (B), who
responded accordingly. These stimuli were selected from the
Communicative Interaction Database (CID [14]) and included:
‘Get down’, ‘Pick it up’, ‘Look at that (ceiling)’, ‘Help yourself’,
and ‘Sit down’. Stimuli in the Individual condition were assembled
by replacing agent A’s communicative action with a non-
communicative action executed with the same onset and
duration (‘Turn’, ‘Jump’, ‘Sneeze’, ‘Lateral step’, and ‘Drink’).
In both the Communicative and the Individual conditions, agent
B’s action (e.g., ‘picking something up’) was always coupled with a
fixed action by agent A (‘pointing to something to be picked up’ in
the Communicative condition; ‘jumping’ in the Individual
condition).
Stimuli were constructed combining motion capture techniques
and animation software [15]. For the Communicative condition
the actions of the two actors were captured simultaneously, in
order to guarantee that B’s response matched A’s communicative
gesture in all respects (e.g. timing, position, kinematics). A and B
were always visible, but the onset of A’s action always preceded
that of B’s action. For the Individual condition A’s action was
captured while the actor was acting alone and was then coupled
with B’s action, so as to maintain the same temporal structure as in
the communicative interaction (i.e., A’s action had the same onset
and duration as in the Communicative condition). Stimulus
duration ranged from 3,600 to 8,200 ms. In both the Commu-
nicative and the Individual conditions, agent A and agent B
remained approximately at a constant distance from the centre of
the screen for the whole duration of the action and never
physically touched one another. In all action stimuli (in both the
Individual and in the Communicative conditions), the agents
always faced each other. Previous research employing the present
stimuli has shown that communicative and individual actions can
be clearly distinguished, and that gestures can be easily identified
by untrained observers (see Manera et al. [14] for a description of
stimulus recognisability).
Apparatus and procedure. Stimuli were presented on a
15.4-inch WXGA screen (display resolution: 12806800; refresh
rate: 60 Hz) using MatLab (7.1 version) software. Viewing distance
was 60 cm. Stimuli were black against a grey background, and
were rendered from a three-quarter view (corresponding to the
125u reference orientation used in the CID). The visual angle
between the points attached to the head and the foot was about
7.15 deg and individual points subtended approximately 0.14 deg
each. Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room.
As we were interested in variations in criterion, we did not use a
forced-choice task as in Manera et al. [5], but a yes-no task [16].
Participants were asked to distinguish between two kind of trials:
signal trials (containing agent B) and noise trials (not containing
agent B). In signal trials, B’s actions were displayed using a limited
lifetime technique and masked with limited lifetime noise dots
[17,18]. Each signal dot was presented for a fixed duration
(200 ms) at one of the 13 possible locations, then disappeared and
reappeared at another randomly chosen location. Six signal dots
per frame were shown. Dot appearance and disappearance were
asynchronous across dots in order to avoid motion transients from
simultaneous transitions of all sampling dots. Noise dots had the
same trajectories, size, and duration as the signal dots, but were
temporally and spatially scrambled (they appeared in a region
sustaining a visual angle of approximately 8.6 deg horizontally and
14.3 deg vertically). The number of noise dots was adjusted
individually for each participant in a training session (see below).
In noise trials, agent B was substituted by limited lifetime scrambled
dots obtained by temporally scrambling the corresponding signal
action. Noise dots were also added so as to obtain the same
number of dots as displayed in the signal trials. Because the
Figure 1. Example of a communicative signal trial. Agent A points to an object to be picked up; agent B bends down and picks it up. B was
presented using limited-lifetime technique (6 signal dots) and masked with temporally scrambled noise dots. The noise level displayed is the
minimum allowed in the experiment (5 noise dots). To provide a static depiction of the animated sequence, dots extracted from 3 different frames are
superimposed and simultaneously represented; the silhouette depicting the human form was not visible in the stimulus display.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022650.g001
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those of signal trials, noise trials were perceptually similar to the
corresponding signal trials [17]. In both signal and noise trials, A
was neither limited lifetime nor masked (see Figure 1).
Participants were instructed to look at each stimulus and to
decide whether it was a signal trial or a noise trial. Responses were
given by pressing one of two keys on a keyboard. Participants were
informed that there were two conditions (Individual vs. Commu-
nicative) and that, in the Communicative condition, the actions of
A and B were semantically related. This was meant to ensure that
participants devoted proper attention to agent A’s actions in both
conditions. In order to minimize response bias, participants were
also informed that the probability of signal or noise was the same
in both conditions. Each participant completed four 30-trial
blocks: 10 actions (5 communicative+5 individual) by 2 types of
trial (signal or noise) by 6 repetitions. Each block consisted of
(signal and noise) trials of both conditions presented in randomized
order. Blocks lasted approximately seven minutes each and were
separated by a rest period of two minutes. Accuracy feedback was
provided after each block.
Training session. Stimuli consisted in five actions performed
by a single agent, masked with five levels of noise (5, 15, 25, 35 or
45 noise dots). Training actions were selected from the CID and
included ‘raising arms’, ‘doing aerobics’, ‘picking something up’,
‘standing up’ and ‘turning’. Each participant completed four
blocks of 25 trials (five actions by five noise levels and by two kinds
of trials –signal/noise – by two repetitions). Trials in each block
were presented in randomized order. Individual noise levels were
determined by fitting a cumulative Gaussian function to the
proportion of correct responses and determining the 75%
threshold. The minimum noise level allowed was five noise dots.
Individual noise levels determined in the preliminary session
ranged from 5 to 26 dots (M=8.7, SD=6.2).
Data Analysis. Following administration, each response was
coded as correct or incorrect. For both the Communicative and
the Individual condition, a correct response was scored for a ‘‘yes’’
response on signal trials and for a ‘‘no’’ response on noise trials. In
order to compare performance in the Communicative and
Individual condition, we also extracted Signal Detection Theory
parameters. For each participant we calculated the number of hits
(‘‘signal’’ responses on signal trials) and false alarms (‘‘signal’’
responses on noise trials) in the two experimental conditions. For
each condition, the hit rate (H) was calculated by dividing the
number of hits by the total number of signal trials (N=30), and the
false alarm rate (F) was calculated by dividing the number of false
alarms by the total number of noise trials (N=30). Following the
standard procedure, rates of 0 were replaced with 0.5/N, and rates
of 1 were replaced with (N20.5)/ N, where N is the number of
signal or noise trials [19]. Criterion (c) and sensitivity (d9)
parameters were extracted as follows [16]:
d0~z(H){z(F)
c~
z(H)zz(F)
2
where the function z is the inverse of the normal distribution
function.
Experiment 2
Participants. Thirty-three undergraduate and graduate
students from the University of Turin (8 male and 25 female,
mean age=20.4 years, age range 18–29) volunteered to take part
in the experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
had provided informed consent and were naı ¨ve with respect to the
purpose of the study. None of Experiment 2 participants had
participated in Experiment 1. The study was approved by the
Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Psychology of the University
of Turin and was conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of two point-light figures, and
belonged to 3 experimental conditions:
1. Communicative-congruent condition. As in Experiment 1, stimuli
displayed a communicative interaction between two agents,
with agent A performing a communicative gesture towards
agent B, who responded accordingly (e.g., A asks B to squat
down, B squats down).
2. Communicative-incongruent condition. Stimuli were assembled by
replacing agent A’s communicative action with a different
communicative action executed with the same timing (com-
municative incongruent actions selected from the CID: ‘Come
closer’, ‘Imitate me’, ‘Move it’, ‘Move over’, and ‘No’). As a
result, B’s response did not match A’s request(e.g., A asks B to
come closer, B squats down).
3. Individual condition. As in Experiment 1, stimuli were assembled
by replacing agent A’s communicative action with a non-
communicative action executed with the same timing (e.g., A
turns around, B squats down).
Apparatus and procedure. Apparatus, procedure, and data
analysis were the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were infor-
med that stimuli could be communicative or individual; they were
further told that, in the Communicative conditions, the actions of
A and B might or might not be semantically related. Participants
completed four blocks of 45 trials: 15 actions (5 Communicative-
congruent+5 Communicative-incongruent+5 Individual) by 2
types of trial (signal or noise) by 6 repetitions.
Post-experiment questionnaire. After the experimental
session, participants were shown each stimulus again and asked
to indicate a) whether the action of agent A was communicative or
individual, and b) whether agent B was present or not. When
participants reported the presence of agent B, they were asked to
specify whether they a) had been guessing, b) had seen a human
figure (or some of its body parts) but did not understand what she
was doing, or c) had seen a human figure performing a specific
action.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 1
The mean proportion of correct answers was .71 (score
range=.53–.97), suggesting that the threshold estimate
calculated in the training session had been sufficiently accurate
for most of participants (Communicative condition: M=.72, score
range=.55–.95; Individual condition: M=.71, score range=.53–
.97). The ‘‘Pick it up’’ action was the most difficult to detect
(M=.63), followed by ‘‘Squat down’’ (M=.70), ‘‘Look at
that-ceiling’’ (M=.71), and ‘‘Help yourself’’ (M=.74). The most
easily detected action was ‘‘Sit down’’ (M=.79).
In both the Communicative and the Individual condition,
participants displayed a conservative detection threshold, as
indicated by the positive mean values of c. Criterion values ranged
from 2.80 to 1.31 (M=.20; SD=.43) in the Communicative
condition and from 2.64 to 1.44 (M=.35; SD=.45) in the
Individual condition. Sensitivity values ranged from .26 to 3.36
(M=1.34; SD=.83) in the Communicative condition and from .17
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Within-subjects ANOVA revealed that, in the Communicative
condition, the response criterion was significantly lower than in the
Individual condition (F(1,22)=9.55; p=.005; Figure 2a). No
significant difference in sensitivity was found (F(1,22)=.43;
p=.517; Figure 2b).
Experiment 2
The mean proportion of correct responses was .76 (score
range=.48–.92). The ‘‘Pick it up’’ action was the most difficult to
detect (M=.69), followed by ‘‘Help yourself’’ (M=.75), ‘‘Look at
that ceiling’’ (M=.77), and ‘‘Squat down’’ (M=.79). The most
easily detected action was ‘‘Sit down’’ (M=.80). For each
participant we extracted criterion (c) and sensitivity (d9) parameters
in the three experimental conditions. In all conditions participants
showed a conservative detection threshold, as indicated by the
positive mean values of the criterion parameter c. Criterion values
ranged from 2.62 to .93 (M=.07; SD=.34) in the Communica-
tive-congruent condition, from 2.70 to 1.23 (M=.20; SD=.45) in
the Communicative-incongruent condition, and from 2.61 to 1.05
(M=.24; SD=.47) in the Individual condition. Sensitivity values
ranged from .73 to 2.95 (M=1.59; SD=.58) in the Communica-
tive-congruent condition, from 2.08 to 3.09 (M=1.73; SD=.66)
in the Communicative-incongruent condition, and from 2.09 to
2.68 (M=1.55; SD=.68) in the Individual condition (Figure 3).
In order to compare criterion and sensitivity among the three
experimental conditions we performed separate ANOVAs with
condition (Communicative-congruent, Communicative-incongru-
ent, and Individual) as the within-subject factor. For the criterion
parameter, ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition
(F2,64)=7.08; p=.002), with c linearly decreasing from the
Communicative-congruent condition to the Communicative-
incongruent condition to the Individual condition (linear contrast:
F(1,32)=15.33; p,.001; Figure 3a). Post-hoc comparisons (with
Bonferroni correction) revealed that c was significantly lower in the
Communicative-congruent condition compared to both the
Communicative-incongruent condition (p=.034) and the Individ-
ual condition (p=.001). No significant difference between the
Communicative-incongruent condition and the Individual condi-
tion was found (p=1.000). For the sensitivity parameter, no
significant effect was found in the ANOVA (F(2,64)=2.12;
p=.128). Furthermore, post-hoc comparisons revealed no signif-
icant difference between the three experimental conditions (ps
ranging from .185 to 1.000; see Figure 3b).
In the post-experiment questionnaire, participants were
accurate in distinguishing between Communicative and
Individual stimuli; the mean proportion of correct responses was
.82 (Communicative-congruent=.81; Communicative-incongru-
ent=.81; Individual=.83). Communicative-congruent and Com-
municative-incongruent stimuli were classified as communicative
equally often (t(32)=2.08, p=.931). Concerning agent B detection,
the proportion of correct responses was .76. False alarms (i.e.,
signal reported when no signal was present; n=105) amounted to
45% of the total errors, and were evenly distributed across
experimental conditions. The great majority of participants
committing false alarms reported having seen a human figure
performing a specific action (44% of the false alarms), or having
seen a human figure (or some of its body parts) performing an
action they could not understand (52% of false alarms). Only a
negligible percentage of participants reported guessing (4% of false
alarms).
It is worth noticing that, even though no significant difference in
criterion was found between the Communicative-incongruent
condition and the Individual condition, the response criterion
showed a significant linear decrease, being highest in the
Individual condition, lower in the Communicative-incongruent
condition, and lowest in the Communicative-congruent condition.
This finding is consistent with a number of possible explanations.
For example, it is possible that response bias made a minor
contribution to changes in c; also, this pattern of results may reflect
the combination of two perceptual effects: a specific effect (B’s
action is predicted based on A’s communicative action) and a
generic effect (the presence, but not the specific action, of B is
predicted based on the communicative nature of A’s action).
Future studies will be necessary to decide between these different
explanations. First, functional MRI studies may help disentangling
perceptual and non-perceptual aspects in the second-agent effect.
Perception of biological motion has been consistently related to
regions along the superior temporal sulcus, the motion-sensitive
region MT, the parietal cortex, and other regions in visual cortex
Figure 2. SDT parameters for the two experimental conditions. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022650.g002
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second agent effect is perceptual in nature, lowering of criterion in
the communicative condition might be expected to modulate
activity within these regions. Second, experiments in which both
agents are masked and participants are not aware that they will
observe communicative actions might help clarifying to what
extent conscious attribution of communicative intention is
necessary to produce a second-agent effect.
General Discussion
Previous research has shown that people can accurately
distinguish between communicative and individual actions under
point-light conditions [14] and that observing a communicative
gesture improves detection of the presence of a second agent [5].
In this study, we demonstrated for the first time that information
extracted from communicative gestures influences the concurrent
processing of biological motion by prompting perception of a
second agent, regardless of whether a second agent was in fact
present or not (second-agent effect). This effect does not merely
depend on observing a generic action performed by another agent
(as we found reliable differences between the Communicative and
Individual condition), nor on the observation of a communicative
gesture per se (as we found differences between the Communica-
tive-congruent and Communicative-incongruent condition). Rath-
er, the results point to a specific effect based on interpersonal
predictive coding, i.e. perception of the communicative gesture of
one agent is used to predict the other agent’s action (creating prior
expectations concerning the presence of the second agent).
Perception of others’ action is not simply a post-hoc recon-
struction of the visual input, but an intrinsically predictive activity
[23]. Predicting what kind of actions others will perform, as well as
when and where others will act is essential for successful
interaction [24]. If humans merely reacted to what they saw
others doing, they could not anticipate their goals and intentions.
Most importantly, they could never achieve the smooth and fast
coordination needed to actively and directly online interact with
others [25].
The second agent effect provides a notable demonstration of the
impact that prior expectations can have on the processing of
others’ actions in social contexts: expectations derived from
interpersonal predictive coding can be so strong as to generate
the illusion to see an agent even when no such agent is in fact
present, a sort of ‘‘Bayesian ghost.’’
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